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 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The search for the origin of religion has been a perennial quest that has engaged 
countless thinkers and scholar for centuries, if not millennia.  Since religion is such a 
foundational aspect of human life, both past and present, there seems no area of life that 
isn’t touched by religion in some way or another.  Religious believers generally take it for 
granted that the worldviews and lifestyles generated by their own traditions involve some 
aspect of the truth, not just in a detached, philosophical way, but as a way of connecting 
all aspects of reality together under a single metaphysical vision.  The very centrality of 
this holistic tendency of religious beliefs has inspired the quest to find the origins of 
religion because, if the key to explaining religion’s power and ubiquitous nature can be 
found, it promises to help explain, or even justify, all sort of human beliefs and actions.  
From metaphysical visions of angels dancing on the heads of pins to the constitution of 
what the particular moral orders of various cultures, societies, and religious groups are, 
knowing the origins of religion will allow us to get a better handle on how countless 
historical (and contemporary) developments in human social and spiritual lives impact all 
sorts of human phenomena.  One doesn’t even have to be a believer in any religious 
tradition to appreciate the importance of religion.  Secular scientists and atheists also 
wish to find the origins of religion, sometimes even in the quest to eradicate or minimize 
religion down to just idiosyncratic beliefs rather than its current expression in various 
institutional and socio-cultural contexts. 
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 While the quest to find the origins of religion has spawned many attempts and 
theories that purport to offer the key to unlocking the secrets of religion, I believe that 
most, if not all, of these theorists, philosophers, theologians, etc. have fallen under the 
same spell that may be traced back to very holistic assumptions of religion itself.  Due to 
this perception of holism in religion itself, even those who are attempting to explain 
religion and its origins from the outside have fallen under this spell.  Even the popular, 
contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett (2006), who purports to explain the naturalistic 
basis of religion by “breaking the spell” that religion holds over us, as the title of his book 
Breaking the Spell tells us, has actually fallen under a greater holistic assumption acting 
as a kind of spell itself.   
 What is this holistic spell?  
 It is the spell that religion itself constitutes a singular phenomenon or 
metaphysical/institutional singularity rather than perhaps it being the product of two (or 
maybe more) distinct, yet related and intimately connected, processes or phenomena.  We 
are so used to referring to “religion” as a catch-all concept that it has acquired a kind of 
semantic vagueness in that almost everybody knows what one is talking about if the word 
“religion” is used in casual speech, and yet it is also very difficult to nail down precise 
boundaries and a singular definition that captures all the various aspects and components 
of what we refer to as “religion.”   
 This vagueness has implications for finding the origin of religion as well, for 
often those who purport to explain religion primarily in terms of various beliefs or 
completely naturalistic processes, such as the aforementioned Daniel Dennett, 
 3 
 
deemphasize some of the social aspects of religion that also dissatisfies other theorists of 
religion. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim is the foundational figure in asserting 
the social reality of religion, as against his predecessors and contemporaries such as 
Herbert Spencer and Edward Tylor, who, presaging Dennett and others by decades, also 
offered up psychologistic explanations of their own regarding religious belief and of the 
origins of religion.   By grounding the origin of religion in some kind of animistic process 
of extending the perception of disembodiment or dream-states into a worldview of the 
universe being full of souls, spirits, or otherwise self-sufficient entities, Spencer, Tylor, 
and others did seem to capture some aspect of religion that rang true, and still rings true 
somewhat for a philosopher such as Dennett, in providing this psychological basis of 
religion.   
As an example of this, in the same book Breaking the Spell, Dennett rests much 
of the case for the origins of religion upon the psychological feature of humans known as 
the “intentional stance,” which is the default inclination in humans to attribute intentions 
and consciousness to all sorts of objects in the world1.  It developed evolutionarily 
because it was more beneficial, for example, to assume that a snake-like object seen in 
the bushes was alive and actually a snake in order to avoid disturbing it than to assume 
that it was just an inert tree branch.  Taking from Justin Barrett’s positing of a mental 
module in humans called the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), Dennett 
expands upon this structural feature of humans to attribute agency to all sorts of objects 
                                                 
1 Dennett is just one of many philosophers and social scientists who hold this view of the 
“intentional stance,” including the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and the 
anthropologist Pascal Boyer. (LeDrew 2016) 
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in the world.  Out of this mental feature comes all sorts of belief in ghosts, mystic forces 
of nature, spirits, gods, and other entities which are a part of our environment and must 
be acknowledged and dealt with lest we underestimate their power and get harmed or 
killed by these entities.  These posited entities then become the basis for religion and 
magic. 
 This line of argument is right in line with the psychologistic explanations 
regarding the origins of religion that Spencer, Tylor, and others gave a century or more 
before, albeit it with more scientific sophistication.  For Durkheim, however, this 
psychologistic view of his predecessors and contemporaries never satisfied him, even as 
he flirted with it in his earlier work.  As the contemporary sociologist and Durkheim 
scholar Alexandra Maryanski has uncovered, Durkheim changed his wording in the 
second edition of his first great work The Division of Labor in Society in a passage 
describing the origins of religion in “naturism” versus his earlier views (Maryanski 
2014).  Durkheim remained dissatisfied with this explanation of the origins being based 
upon naturism and turned instead towards totemism and the more general concept of 
“collective representation” in his goal to show the social nature of religion as against 
purely psychologistic explanations of his predecessors and contemporaries. 
The primary goal of this paper is to argue that both explanatory strategies 
regarding the analysis of the origins of religion, the psychologistic and the sociological, 
are correct in their own ways and reflect two different aspects of what most of us think 
about when we use the concept of “religion.”   
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Applying Evolutionary Principles to Religion 
 
In the past few decades, there has been an increased discussion and debate 
regarding the evolutionary origins of religion and whether it should be considered an 
adaptation derived from natural selection, a byproduct or spandrel, or even as what 
Dawkins (2004) called a “mind virus” that parasitically possesses human minds and is 
transmitted from mind to mind as “meme” in a manner such as a virus.  As I argue later, I 
believe that there are elements of religion which are derived from natural selection and 
are based in biology, but that there are also many elements which do act more like 
Darwinian by-products.  While some theorists and researchers incorporate Darwinian 
evolutionary logic into explaining the presence and development of religion and do 
believe that religion has some functional relationship with evolutionary fitness 
considerations, I don’t see many arguing for a kind of conceptual kind of split such that I 
will do.  A theorist such as Pascal Boyer (2002) in Religion Explained derives much of 
his explanations for religion from underlying Darwinian evolutionary developments 
within humans, especially in regards to certain developed cognitive capacities, while 
other more conventional theorists focus mostly on the cultural and historical roots of 
specific religions rather than attempting to find a more fundamental cause or explanation 
of religion as a general social phenomenon.  Other theorists, most notably Stark and 
Bainbridge (1996) take a more axiomatic approach to religion and explain some of the 
underlying logic that drives religion and its development without necessarily getting into 
the specific evolutionary causes of this logic.  While there is a sort of implicit functional 
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angle here in which certain developments of religious forms are oriented towards meeting 
certain human needs, such as with their concept of “compensators” and how they act as 
otherworldly substitutes for this-worldly rewards, there isn’t as explicit a connection of 
their overall logic with either Darwinian or sociocultural evolution.   
Closer to my approach and perspective are theorists such as Robert Bellah (2011), 
Ara Norenzayan (2013), and Stephen K. Sanderson (2018) who do incorporate both 
Darwinian and sociocultural evolutionary factors in their analysis. Their analyses 
typically first involve arguing for the reasons that religion developed in the first place as 
a part of Darwinian evolution before going on to explore specific religious sociocultural 
developments as various cultures and societies evolved over time into more complex 
societies.  This increased complexity then is one of the main causes which spawns new 
sociocultural selection forces which allow for the further development of various 
sociocultural forms to meet these new challenges.  These theorists do a masterful job of 
bringing various concrete examples and data from historical and anthropological sources 
towards showing how religion has developed across time.  They persuasively show how 
different societies and their religious forms have both certain commonalities with each 
other, as well as divergences, and how both of these commonalities and divergences can 
be traced to both an underlying logic of sociocultural religious development as well as to 
concrete historical examples involving degrees of contingency and meaningful variation. 
My proposed contribution to this literature is to draw a few more fine-pointed 
distinctions that, at least conceptually, will help us more clearly see how both Darwinian 
and sociocultural evolutionary forces are involved in religion and how these two have 
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resulted in two different processes which are somewhat distinct and yet still deeply 
interrelated with each other.  The long-term goal is to show how certain features of 
religion are based upon their development due to Darwinian selection forces which can’t 
be merely overcome through sociocultural change and which are actually strongly 
programmed into our biological human nature.  I feel that many of the previous theorists 
and scholars have done an excellent job of explaining the development many religious 
forms, past and present, without necessarily honing in on a certain feature of religion that 
I believe may become even more pertinent in future forms of religion.  Newer and more 
unconventional forms of religion may not fit the standard picture of religion that many 
have held onto and so I think we need to sharpen a few intellectual tools in order to tackle 
these newer religious forms. 
 
Mapping the Split 
 
 As a way of recognizing both the validity of some aspects of the psychologistic 
explanations and of some aspects of the sociological explanation, I propose that we 
“break the spell” of assuming that religion constitutes a holistic phenomenon.  I believe 
that, analytically, religion can be broken down into two broad and separate, yet also 
interconnected and interactive, processes, each of which has a different basis from the 
other one2.  They mutually reinforce each other in many aspects and influence each other 
                                                 
2 Contemporary theorists of religion have often recognized how the term “religion” is an 
“an umbrella term, bundling together different meanings on the basis of a family 
resemblance (Vaas 2009).” My attempt to split up religion into separate aspects is not 
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so deeply as to appear to be one phenomenon on the surface.  It is meant not to be a 
literal breaking apart of religion into these two forms, but rather it is meant to be a 
starting off point for potential future study into how both of these function and how they 
may change or not change over time.  These are “ideal types” and don’t represent actual 
features of religion that are pristine and strictly modular from each other.  Rather, this is a 
kind of a thought experiment in order to tease apart how religion possess features that are 
both universal and relatively fixed in the human species, as well as features that are 
highly variable, especially in context of various ecological and social environments that 
spawn religious forms and belief systems.  While religion as an actual phenomenon 
contains overlapping elements from both of these processes, at least for analytical and 
schematic purposes I will now proceed in this analysis as if they were distinct from each 
other.   
These two forms, which I have labeled “Religion-B” and “Religion-M,” may be 
roughly conceptualized as involving two sub-systems of the conventional or common 
conception of religion, which I have labeled “Religion-C.”  These are two deeply 
connected sub-systems and so they exert a lot of influence upon each other and it is 
                                                 
new as some theorists have already sought to divide religion into a variety of separate 
processes or aspects, each of which may be subject to some form of biological evolution 
(Feierman 2009) For example, Feierman divides religion into “behavior, beliefs, values, 
moods, and feelings” while Vaas divides religion into the characteristics of 
“transcendence,” “ultimate relatedness,” “mysticism,” “myth,” “morality,” “rite,” and 
“community.”  While these expanded designations of the internal components of religion 
may have much going for them, I will use the dualistic model that I’ve developed, both 
for the sake of simplicity of argument and for my admittedly sometimes too infatuated 
inclination to look at the world in terms of dualisms. 
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important to note that this isn’t a claim that these two subsystems necessarily have clear 
and sharp boundaries.  I believe, however, that it is an important potential move in 
helping to analytically separate these two sub-types of Religion-C in order to generate a 
potential research program that could either support or disprove my assertions, if only 
they can somehow be operationalized.  
 For a visualization of this split of religion into two processes, I present the 
following simple model: 
 
(Religion-C) = (Religion-M) + (Religion-B) 
 
 “Religion-C” represents the common way that people represent and talk about 
religion, both in casual, ordinary language, as well as the way that many scholars tend to 
refer to religion.  While at the purely definitional level of semantic rigor the term 
“religion” (as represented by Religion-C in my formulation) is pretty loose and it may not 
always be used in a logically consistent manner.  In practical terms of everyday usage, 
most people seem to use the generic concept of “religion” in a similar way to each other 
for the most part.  For example, many would say that Christianity is a religion, but many 
would also say that something like nationalism isn’t a religion, formally speaking.  
However, I would argue that something like nationalism can be a form of religion (or 
may at least be considered as being a “religious” worldview or orientation) in that a 
phenomenon such as nationalism is specifically grounded upon a form of “Religion-M”, 
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to be discussed momentarily, and just not necessarily in the conventional way that most 
people use the term “religion.” 
 
Religion-B 
 
 Let us start with the one aspect of “Religion-C” which I have called “Religion-B.”  
The “B” in “Religion-B” represents the concept of “belief” or “belief system.” This 
aspect of religion roughly corresponds to the psychologistic perspectives that have been 
given by so many scholars of religion, including the aforementioned Spencer, Tylor, and 
Dennett.   Religion-B deals with all those aspects that are experienced generally at the 
level of the individual and within individual consciousnesses, though there is a large 
social aspect that plays out in the intersubjective formation of common religious 
worldviews as well.  Religion-B can be classified as primary dealing with 
epistemological and metaphysical issues within Religion-C, including issues involving 
individual perceptions and beliefs in which some aspect of extra-normal reality is 
presented to the individual as being true and existent.  This is the broad realm of dealing 
with ghosts, souls, gods, voices coming from burning bushes, believing that one is 
possessed by an evil demon, etc.  These are all experienced at the individual level, even 
though they may have many social elements mixed in there as well.  For instance, one 
isn’t likely to believe in demonic possession if one was raised in a community that 
doesn’t believe in demons.  This social element in the case of Religion-B provides the 
context and possibilities for how individual beliefs and experiences will be represented to 
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individuals themselves.  In this sense, every experience that occurs to the individual can 
be said to be an “individual representation,” which to be distinguished from “collective 
representation” that Durkheim used.  The individual experiences something and, just 
because of the nature of being human, creates some kind of explanation for themselves in 
terms of representational beliefs.  The individual organism may be experiencing extreme 
tiredness at a biological level, for instance, but at the level of “individual representation,” 
the individual may represent that tiredness as coming from a curse placed on them by a 
rival clan, or of eating the wrong kind of food earlier in the day, or of not sleeping well 
the night before, etc.  In the context of this argument, the “fact-of-the-matter” of what is 
causing the experience of being tired is not of primary importance; rather the crucial 
point is to examine how individuals represent to themselves why they are experiencing 
what they are experiencing.    
 Moving from the construction of individual representations and beliefs to the 
larger evolutionary development of Religion-B, Religion-B may be considered as an 
emergent byproduct of a variety of underlying cognitive mechanisms, one of which 
includes the aforementioned “Hyperactive Agency Detection Device,” each of which 
may be subject on their own to various evolutionary selectionist forces at the biological 
level.  However, once Religion-B emerges on top of these individual cognitive 
mechanisms, it may be considered as a kind of vessel whose content becomes much more 
influenced by sociocultural evolution than the Darwinian, biological evolution of its 
constituent parts, such as with the HADD.  This is important because once Religion-B 
emerges, it does carry with it more social features than for the underlying components 
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which compose it and, therefore, becomes more subject to sociocultural evolutionary 
forces which are beyond the level of individual representation. 
 
Religion-M 
 
 In contrast to Religion-B, Religion-M isn’t about beliefs.  Rather, it is about 
emotions related to the formation and identification of in-groups and moral communities 
and how certain emotions get generated which act as a bonding mechanism to maintain 
and reinforce communities, which in turn acts as a relatively cohesive social unit 
involved in both intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition.  The “M” part of 
Religion-M can be short hand for that notion of a “moral community.” Religion-M is the 
essentially social nature of religious feeling, bonding, and of collective moral emotions 
and is the genesis of, and is synonymous with, an important aspect of morality3.   
I believe that Religion-M is what Durkheim was fundamentally aiming at with 
many his theories, both regarding religion and regarding his overwhelming concern with 
social solidarity, although he too seemingly believed in religion as a singular 
phenomenon.  To reiterate, my schema labels Religion-M as that force which binds 
                                                 
3 To clarify, by “morality,” this doesn’t mean that it is necessarily “moral” or “ethical” in 
the traditional sense whereby “morality” refers to some objectively transcendent set of 
principles acting as the basis for “moral” action.  “Morality,” in this argument, is 
“functional”, in the philosophical sense of “functional” rather than the sociological sense 
of “functional,” in that anything that functions as a way of achieving group solidarity can 
be considered “moral,” by definition.  If human sacrifice acts as one way of keeping a 
social unit together, then it is “moral” even if many today would consider it “immoral.”   
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individuals together into a moral community.  Our evolutionary history is intimately 
connected with other apes and their comparatively individualistic natures (as compared to 
other primates such as monkeys), and yet we can come together into some kind of 
collective or group which would not exist otherwise (Maryanski and Turner 2013).  In 
order to facilitate this bonding of individuals into a larger collective, there must be some 
kind of emotional predisposition towards the generation of some kind of “collective 
effervescence,” as Durkheim called that strange feeling that arises over a collective 
gathering sharing a common experience (Durkheim 1995)4.  Shared beliefs and shared 
worldviews are not enough to bind individuals together without the added emotional 
capacity and inclination to form communities centered around those shared beliefs and 
worldviews.  In fact, emotions are necessary in the coherence of collectives over time. 
 
Different Forms of Selectionism at Work 
 
Different processes of evolution are at play with these two forms of religion 
because one of them (Religion-M) is primarily derived out of Darwinian processes of 
biological evolution, while the other form (Religion-B) changes much more in line with 
sociocultural evolutionary forces.  Understanding these two different types of evolution 
                                                 
4 This feeling of “oneness,” in which divergent individuals gather together in order to 
form a singular sense of identity in some kind of community, then may represent itself in 
the form of some kind of totem, object, or symbol which then becomes “sacred” and 
imbued with some special characteristic that then comes to stand for the whole 
community and its identity qua community.   
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plays an important role in helping to define and distinguish these two forms of religion 
from each other and what selective pressures are working upon each of these forms. 
In terms of selection pressures on various features of our world, from the initial 
reliance upon Darwin’s notion of natural selection as being a biological process which 
selects for certain traits and biological structures within species over time, the idea of 
“selection” has been expanded by some to include forms of selectionism that work upon 
the forms and structures of social and cultural features in humans beyond just biology 
(Runciman 2009).  Sociocultural evolution is the process of social and cultural change 
over time due to a variety of selection pressures and mechanisms at that level of social 
structure and culture.  It is important to note that sociocultural evolution isn’t a 
“progressive” notion, as the argument isn’t that human cultures are converging upon 
some ideal over time with some forms being “higher” and some being “lower.”  It is 
merely the process of change over time without necessary regard as to what is ultimately 
the “best” or “highest” form of human social organization. 
In the biological sciences, there has been a long debate regarding at which levels 
of life natural selection mostly, or solely, works on (Keller 1999).  For instance, the 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins famously argued in his book The Selfish Gene 
that it was the gene that is the fundamental level at which selection works (Dawkins 
2016).  Others have argued for other levels, such as at the cell level, the individual 
organism level, or the group level (Okasha 2006).  There are also a number of biologists 
and social scientists who subscribe to “multi-level selection” whereby there are selection 
processes going on at all of these levels (Wilson and Sober 1994).  By extension, it has 
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been argued that culture is itself ultimately a part of the natural world because it 
developed out of certain evolutionary and social contexts, even to the point where there is 
a co-evolutionary process of genes and culture (Boyd and Richarson 1988).   
Once there is a connection made between biological evolution and sociocultural 
evolution, then it is only a logical step to claim that forces of selection and selection 
pressures also impact the development of sociocultural systems, which in turn change 
over time to meet a whole host of different pressures.  The precise mechanisms of social 
selection are debated, but according to the recent book The Emergence and Evolution of 
Religion by Means of Natural Selection, the authors have labeled a variety of selection 
processes that impact how sociocultural systems change and develop, not only in religion 
but in social processes in general (Turner et al. 2017).  For the purposes of this paper, the 
details of each of these sociocultural selection processes are not important except to note 
that as one moves into these sociocultural selection processes, the direct impact of 
biological evolution is constrained in many ways.  Biological evolution has resulted in 
the creation of certain biological and neurological features within humans, but once 
humans biologically evolved to a certain level of complexity, then sociocultural 
evolutionary factors come to play an increasingly large role in the actual manifestation of 
various sociocultural features.  I use as support of the contention of my main argument 
the fact that these authors, as well as others, do draw an important distinction between 
Darwinian evolution and sociocultural evolution. 
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Evolutionary Development of the Two Forms 
 
 In terms of the origins of Religion-B and Religion-M, both hacame about after a 
long evolutionary development from earlier forms that can be seen in other animal 
species.  Regarding Religion-B, precursor forms of its psychological constituents appear 
in other animals qua certain psychological characteristics that are analogous to, or even 
the same as, psychological characteristics and beliefs in humans (Wynne and Udell 
2013).  One may also conceive of these characteristics as being the precursors to a kind 
of proto-Religion-B in the sense that these other animals may be experiencing something 
which, only with later evolutionary developments in humans, came to be the basis for the 
emergence of Religion-B.  
 Let us engage in a brief thought experiment.  Most of us who have been around 
dogs have seen them occasionally jerk around or whine while sleeping.  Many have 
concluded that dogs are indeed dreaming and may be experiencing very similar 
experiences that humans do when we dream (Cohen 2012). Let us presume that these 
dogs may be “seeing” other dogs, humans, and living beings while they are dreaming, 
similar to way that people do when we dream.  In a sense, they are experiencing a kind of 
alternate reality or a simulation of reality. 
 What is the relevance of this point to the development of Religion-B?  Herbert 
Spencer thought that religion for humans, in the form of animism, originated from the 
experience of dreaming of one’s consciousness (or soul or spirit) disengaging from the 
body and roaming around, or of seeing the images or “ghosts” of dead relatives in their 
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dreams (Turner 2017). In this way, in our waking lives, these experiences which have 
occurred in our dream state form the basis of our extending the notion of there existing 
disembodied souls out not only in our dream worlds, but in our waking worlds as well.  
What was previously just a kind of experiential phenomenon occurring when one is 
asleep takes on the force of an explicit belief while we are awake, which can then be 
extended and modified to spawn a whole range of other metaphysical beliefs based upon 
this kind of experientially-based animism.   
 Looking at dogs, it is unlikely that they have the cognitive sophistication to have 
the kind and structure of explicit, complex, and higher order beliefs in the same way that 
humans do.  It is largely a definitional and philosophical matter of what a belief even is 
and belief is defined in different ways by different researchers and philosophers (Dennett 
1995).  I agree with those who say that it is only with the development of some kind of 
symbolically complex language that beliefs are able to emerge at the level of being fully-
formed, complex and self-conscious representations accessible internally to an individual 
consciousness as an explicit belief5.  However, the somewhat similar basis for 
experiencing dream worlds between ourselves and dogs may point to the fact that many 
of our non-human, mammalian relatives have the rudimentary beginnings of what could 
later develop into the emergence of Religion-B in humans. 
                                                 
5 Unlike those philosophical epiphenomenalists who argue that beliefs have no causal 
power, I do think that beliefs can influence behavior and cause action to occur, both at the 
individual level and even at the collective level.  Shared beliefs, or at the very least 
shared representations, may sometimes form the basis of collective action (Bandura 
2000). 
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 In contrast, Religion-M, or at least its potential precursor, would seem to only be 
present in a sufficiently advanced and complex species that also has some kind of 
mechanism for sociality and social bonding involving individuals beyond just their 
structure in a dominance hierarchy. The existence of some kind of collective structure or 
collective “reality” that can work down from some form of collective representation and 
involves some sort of collective control mechanism working upon individuals within a 
collective is also needed.  A very individualistic species that somehow developed a 
certain level of cognitive sophistication without the accompanying need to develop 
sociality and social bonding could conceivably develop Religion-B without needing to 
develop Religion-M as a source of social bonding and the forming of moral communities.  
Conceivably, a species (or even some forms of AI) such as this could believe in gods, 
spirits, etc. of a metaphysical kind in order to explain or represent their world while not 
needing the glue of a social cohesion and a social control mechanism such as morality. In 
contrast, a more social species which requires a greater capacity to coordinate disparate 
and individualistic individuals into collective action would need some kind of way to 
coordinate their activities and systems of “morality” to function as a form of a social 
cohesion and control.  
 One way of looking to see if this division of Religion-C into Religion-B and 
Religion-M may be a valid one is to look at how various scholars and thinkers have 
analyzed Religion-C in the past.  If they themselves tend to implicitly divorce Religion-B 
from Religion-M without realizing it, which I believe many have, then that may provide 
some evidence that such a division implicitly exists.  An example of this implicit division 
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can be seen in critiques of Religion-C such as those that come from the so-called “New 
Atheists” of contemporary intellectual life. 
 
The “New Atheist” Critique of Religion 
 
 One way to potentially show how there might be these two aspects to Religion-C 
is to show how self-declared critics or antagonists of Religion-C often tend to focus 
almost exclusively on the Religion-B aspect without even acknowledging the Religion-M  
aspect that often gives Religion-C much of its emotional power in driving human action.  
In this case, I bring in the critiques of Religion-C brought by the so-called “New 
Atheists,” who have sometimes been called by the self-label of the “Four Horseman,” 
which consists of the figures of the neuroscientist Sam Harris, the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett, the author Christopher Hitchens, and the biologist Richard Dawkins (Zenk 
2013). When these individuals comment on the subject of Religion-C, I inevitably hear a 
focused attack on the silliness or harmful nature of the beliefs that Religion-C engenders.  
They usually focus on some aspect of religious mythology or metaphysical instances of 
the supposedly supernatural world causing something in the natural world in a direct and 
obvious way.  These beliefs are, to the New Atheists at least, completely irrational and 
have little to no place in modern and contemporary societies.  They may recognize that 
these beliefs could have had served some functional purpose in the past, but their 
critiques are almost entirely epistemologically based in the sense of attacking or 
defending various claims that involve an individual reasoner assessing these claims.  This 
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is still using a form of analysis that is common in the history of philosophy in Western 
thought, especially since Descartes, whereby a certain form of skepticism is used at the 
level of an individual subject assessing the truth or falsity of countless “states of affairs” 
in which the issue involves how an individual’s beliefs and assertions map onto or 
correspond with the world (Braver 2007). 
 However, this approach still fails to appreciate the more social aspect of Religion-
C as shown in its Religion-M aspect.  To be sure, individuals such as the New Atheists do 
recognize and occasionally comment upon the social nature of religion, especially in 
critiquing the more herd-like, non-skeptical approach of many religious believers 
“blindly” following authoritative figures, but they still fail to fully address the social 
aspect that is built into Religion-C as a phenomenon itself.  Sam Harris in his book The 
Moral Landscape does explicitly say that:  
“Clearly, religion cannot be reduced to a mere concatenation of 
religious beliefs.  Every religion consists of rites, rituals, prayers, 
social institutions, holidays., and these serve a wide variety of 
purposes, conscious and otherwise.” (Harris 2010: 148)  
 
Harris then, however, goes on to write more about the nature of religious beliefs and 
rarely brings a social element back into the discussion, indicating that the social aspects 
derived from Religion-M within Religion-C are much more tangential in his view than 
the explicitly cognitive aspects concerning beliefs that he focused upon.   
Bringing it back to Durkheim, the insightful and important contribution of 
Durkheim to discussions regarding Religion-C was in recognizing and making much 
more explicit the social nature of Religion-C itself, which can be represented as being the 
central feature of Religion-M as I have formulated it.  We are not just thinking creatures; 
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we are also feeling and social creatures and so these aspects of us should not be swept 
aside in order to focus only on beliefs and cognitive processes. 
  
The Importance of Durkheim, Totemism, and Symbolic Thinking 
 
 In many ways, Emile Durkheim should really get credit as the intellectual figure 
who was really able to implicitly identify Religion-M as coming from an explicitly social 
process and interaction effect between individuals within a social and moral community.  
As mentioned before, his thought was an important corrective to the excessively 
psychologistic explanations of Religion-C given by figures such as Tylor and Spencer.  
His emphasis on this social aspect allowed for a certain division already of Religion-C 
into that which is social and forms the bases for collective representations versus that 
which is more individualized and psychological in individual representation.  One can see 
this clearly in his definition of religion given in his 1912 book The Elementary Forms of 
the Religious Life, which is: 
“A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to 
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- 
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them.” (Durkheim 
1995:62) 
 
 The key phrases in this definition which are important to note are “sacred things,” 
and “unite into a single moral community.”  Durkheim’s usage of the idea of sacredness 
here without explicitly mentioning the importance of there being a belief in an explicitly 
“supernatural” world is important to the later part of my argument in which I argue 
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against the notion, which is common among many other definitions of religion, that 
religion requires, or is necessarily centrally-based upon, beliefs about the supernatural.  
In my reading, all sorts of representations of sacredness can elevate a system of beliefs 
into being religious and sacredness doesn’t necessarily have to connect to what is 
considered the supernatural.  Sacredness may connect to what I call the “meta-natural,” 
which is some sacred, symbolic, and perhaps emergent element which is considered as 
somehow elevated above mere nature (and Durkheim’s notion of profaneness) and yet is 
not elevated into an ontological realm or separate reality, like how supernatural elements 
tend to be held.  Therefore, certain symbolic representations like the “Nation” or the 
“People” become kinds of meta-natural ideas which is held to be sacred to ideology of 
nationalism.  Yet, these representations are generally not considered to represent 
something which somehow exists outside of the natural world in a special, supernatural 
realm6.  The importance of recognizing this point is that it frankly allows for a more 
promiscuous usage of the concept of religion to be applied in many instances in which 
more conventional definers of religion do not wish to apply the concept to.  Critics may 
object precisely to this promiscuity, but I personally welcome an expanded application of 
the concept of religion to many features of our social world and to our ideologies. 
 As far as the phrase “unite into a single moral community” in Durkheim’s 
definition, this has explicit impact upon my schema of the division of Religion-C.  This 
                                                 
6 Certain more mystical types may elevate the “Nation” into a kind of special, 
supernatural existence, or believe the “Nation” or the “People” as at least being the path 
through which the supernatural realm acts upon the natural world through some kind of 
divine providence. 
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phrase implies that it is a necessary function of what is to be considered religious that it 
be able to act as a way of unifying individuals into some kind of collective moral 
community.  The “M” of my “Religion-M” is explicitly taken from the notion of a “moral 
community” and so, if one accepts my division of Religion-C into Religion-B and 
Religion-M, then one can see that both of them are contained in Durkheim’s definition of 
religion, but not in many other definitions of religion.   
 While Durkheim may not have seen things the way that I’m arguing in terms of a 
division of Religion-C into two aspects, I’d argue that his focus on totemism towards the 
later part of his career actually represents an implicit attempt to integrate those two 
aspects of Religion-B and Religion-M back into a more unified phenomenon.  Totems 
and their symbolic importance represent a way in which the collectively emotional 
feeling of being in a moral community can be joined to specific symbols in such a way as 
that the totemic symbol can be used as a way not merely to represent the moral 
community, but to in fact spur the emotional feelings of solidarity within a moral 
community and in drawing distinctions between different moral communities.  Hence the 
emotional importance of all sorts of totems, including flags, colors for a sports team, and 
even perhaps abstract identity totems used in contemporary “identity politics” in which a 
group of individuals will circle around some abstract representation of their collective 
identity in order to draw a distinction between themselves and others and to generate 
emotional attachment to the identity totem and, as a result, to each other.  In this way, the 
impulse of the moral community to define itself vis-a-vis Religion-M meets the more 
explicitly symbolic forms inherent in representations and which, through language, 
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become the building blocks for higher order beliefs and the basis for Religion-B.  These 
higher order beliefs, which can be consciously perceived in the mind and articulated in a 
way via meta-cognition, necessarily involve a more sophisticated relationship of symbols 
to both things in the world and to other symbols.  
 
How Cognition Developed to Enable Religion-B to Symbolically Connect with Religion-
M 
 
 These cognitive abilities allowing for the construction of higher order beliefs are 
important as a way of explaining the nature of Religion-B, and beliefs more generally, 
and how the symbolic thinking generated from these cognitive abilities allows for the 
connection of Religion-M to Religion-B.  Michael Corballis (2014) argues that it is the 
feature of recursion within the human cognitive system which allows our thinking, and 
hence our beliefs, to radically expand our generation of symbols to the point where we 
are just awash in symbols and symbolic thinking, to the point where Terrence Deacon 
(1997) has called us the “symbolic species.”  Corballis believes that it is recursion, in 
combination with the expansion of memory capacities, specifically episodic memory, that 
allows humans to “time travel” in our heads beyond just the present, as well as to 
formulate complex stories and to engage into cognitive “displacement,” in which things 
can be thought and talked about which are not directly present to the individual at a 
particular time and place.  Out of recursion also comes the “theory of mind” in which 
other people’s perspectives and thoughts can be considered within our own thoughts.  
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There are various levels or orders of theory of mind, and humans appear to be the only 
species that engages in higher order thinking.  There is still much contention and debate 
regarding the sophistication, or even presence, of the theory of mind that our closest ape 
cousins (as well as certain other animals like dolphins, elephants, and certain birds) may 
possess, but chimpanzees do appear to consistently fail “false-belief” tests that young 
children pass after a certain age (Call and Tomasello 2008).  This indicates that 
chimpanzees may possess a zero-order level instantiation of a theory of mind, but that a 
first-order level theory of mind is unlikely, and a second-order (and beyond) theory of 
mind is clearly beyond the capacity of chimpanzees to engage in. 
 This is all important because the development of language, recursion, and other 
evolutionary developments have allowed humans to engage in an explosive expansion of 
cognitive abilities and usage of symbolic thought, which has allowed for the creation of 
more complex beliefs and social organization.  The philosopher John Searle has argued 
that it is through language that we create and negotiate a larger portion of our collective 
interaction in the social world and allows for the generation of collective beliefs and 
“institutional facts” (Searle 2009).  This fits into the general Durkheimian perspective, 
but the main thing to note here is that no other animals appear to be able create these 
kinds of “institutional facts” and collective beliefs.  Some may possess a kind of “proto-
language” or “proto-recursion” or “proto-theory of mind.”  The presence of these features 
in other ape species indicates that their development into the forms of actual language, 
recursion, and theory of mind that we humans possess today was largely the consequence 
of evolutionary selection pressures that our hominin ancestors were subject to after 
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hominins split off from the last common ancestor (LCA) that they shared with 
chimpanzees and bonobos.   
In the context of this paper’s overall argument, the importance of this is to 
provide the background for the underlying biological bases that allow for the emergence 
of Religion-B and how the fundamentally recursive and symbolic nature of Religion-B is 
what allows for it to be subject to not just biological evolution, but sociocultural 
evolution.  Since symbols and representations are often semi-arbitrary and not necessarily 
connected to the real world directly, this means that specific symbols, as well as their 
accompanying symbolic systems, can change relatively rapidly and are often constrained 
more by historical inertia (i.e. via something like path dependence) than by strict 
biological necessity.  This means that, as being subject to sociocultural evolution, 
symbols and symbolic systems can then be subject to all sorts of influences and selection 
forces that otherwise are absent in species that don’t possess our level of symbolic usage. 
 Coming back to Durkheim’s totemism, this comes into play here because through 
the medium of representative and cognitive processes, the more emotional aspects of our 
social identities as members of moral communities then get transformed and expressed 
into more symbolic representations of those social emotions.  Therefore, what 
emotionally is a kind of unarticulated sense of “we-ness” of the moral community based 
upon emotional ties of social connectiveness then gets more explicitly symbolic forms 
attached to those emotions.  In a sense, “collective effervescence” gets converted into 
“collective representation” through this process of mediation.  These “collective 
representations” then often find themselves expressed in terms of some sort of totemic 
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image that acts to bind separate individuals together.  In terms of my argument, Religion-
M gets generally expressed through the mechanisms of Religion-B in this case of 
“collective representation” via the creation of a totemic symbol.  In other words, the 
social aspect of Religion-C, which is the more emotional part (Religion-M), gets 
processed through the more cognitive aspects of our psychology, which then provides the 
conceptual resources to label those emotions and convert them into symbolic form 
(Religion-B).  In this way, Durkheim’s totemism is showing a way how these two 
different aspects of Religion-C can be integrated under one symbolic form.  I’d still argue 
that the underlying two aspects of Religion-B and Religion-M are still somewhat distinct 
from each other beneath the surface, but Religion-C, as that which more people reference 
when they refer to the term “religion,” involves both of these aspects.   This is especially 
true when conceived of under the form of various totemic representations, which reflect 
our more groupish emotional inclinations, including in all sorts of ethnocentric beliefs 
and representations.  The ability of religious thinking to generate a circling of individuals 
around a symbolic representation or totem of some sort then becomes an explicit 
hallmark of the more hidden Religion-M in the creation of a moral order around that 
symbolic representation.  This becomes important in the next stage of my argument in 
that I argue that many different forms of human sociality which revolve around a central, 
sacred representation can be categorized as being religious, if not a full-blown religion.  
How are we then to distinguish between those systems of belief that are religious versus 
those that are not? 
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Clarifying What Can be Considered “Religious” 
 
One of the potential problems with the analysis done so far is that one could argue 
that practically everything in our social lives has a religious element of some sort or 
another.  In some sense, from a certain point in the development of human culture, 
everything was infused with religious aspects.  Beyond conventional definitions of 
Religion-C that correspond to our identification of “religion” with specific existent 
religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc., I would argue that so-
called “political religions” and “civic religions” fit into the category of being religious 
according to my formulation of involving both elements of Religion-M and Religion-B.  
The objection to this is that, generally speaking, these latter sorts of religions don’t have 
certain traditionally conceived features of religion with the creation and maintenance of 
certain formal institutional structures or a belief in the supernatural.  While it is true that 
these kinds of religions do not fit into traditional definitions of religion, I argue that they 
can be considered as being religious because, as with such things as nationalism 
mentioned earlier, there is a kind of totem involved around which individuals place some 
kind of sacredness upon it and it specifically acts as a source of social distinctions, social 
bonding, and social exclusion.  If it were just a certain kind of belief system or worldview 
that didn’t have that element of sacredness and of social cohesion, then it would lack the 
features of Religion-M and would be closer to a “pure” type of Religion-B in which there 
was some kind of systematic web of associated beliefs and practices but without the force 
of morality and of making social distinctions of a moral nature. 
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A key linguistic distinction here is between the term “religion,” (as Religion-C), 
which is a noun and indicative of some kind of thing or object, with the term “religious,” 
which is an adjective and adjectives act as a modifier or descriptor to nouns.  In this way, 
a “religion” has a connotation that lends itself to a kind of reification and in which, as a 
noun, it brings with it a kind of semantic essentialism in the sense that a noun indicates 
that the thing described as some sort of coherence or essense internal to it and which can 
also correspond to something specific, whether concrete or abstract, that the noun points 
to.  This is why it is much more difficult to identify worldviews or ideologies like 
scientism and humanism as being religious.  However, as an adjective at least, the term 
“religious” can also be applied to a whole range of social phenomena that don’t often get 
thought of as being traditionally “religious.”  While many may not see the utility of 
drawing such a finely pointed difference between the words “religion” and “religious,” 
and may say that this tactic just complicates things unnecessarily, I believe that it is 
important to draw this distinction if only to act a kind of tool for showing how traditional, 
more narrow conceptions of what a “religion” can be seen as being somewhat continuous 
with my more broad conception of what counts as being “religious.”  Ultimately, I’m 
calling for an extension of the usage of term “religious” to include all sorts of belief 
systems or ideologies that contain a strong element of Religion-M within them. 
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An Unorthodox Example: Scientism and Science 
 
As an example of something that fits the criteria of both Religion-M and 
Religion-B, I submit that what some have called “scientism” fits into the same category 
and form as being a “religious” worldview, even if it is not a full-blown religion.  
“Scientism,” as I define it, is the worldview that consists of the proposition that science is 
the only real, or at least the only legitimate, form of knowledge acquisition available to 
humans.  All other forms of knowledge are either false, illusory, or merely degraded or 
debased forms of science.  In contrast to “scientism,” “science” itself is not a “religion” 
or “religious” but is instead to be considered most basically as both an intellectual 
framework and as a widespread social institution.  The label of “science” describes a 
process of knowledge acquisition that, if one takes a Popperian perspective, generates 
certain propositions that themselves can be falsified, at least in theory.  As a practice or 
process, science can generate these propositions without necessarily connecting all of 
them together into a grand, unified perspective or comprehensive worldview.  In order to 
knit together all the individual scientific propositions into a singular worldview in which 
all scientific propositions constitute a single body of knowledge, it takes human minds (or 
consciousnesses of some kind) to enact this project of constructing a whole.  At this 
point, the process of “science” may become “scientism” and take on a “religious” 
character, as I’ve defined “religious,” because of how the enterprise of science can take 
on a sacred character to its practitioners and create a sacred community of “those who do 
science” versus those who do not.   This then becomes a social distinction and a 
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moralizing element in which a group of individuals circle around the totem of “Science,” 
and this process clearly has an element of Religion-M to it.  There comes to exist a 
community of scientists in which not everyone is automatically let in.  Many individuals 
may “do” science, but the social category of being explicitly a scientist has a boundary, 
however fuzzy or porous that it may be, that draws a kind moral distinction for those who 
subscribe to scientism.  When science just remains a set of propositions which, although 
interconnected with each to some degree or another, is used to describe some domain of 
knowledge, then it is not inherently moralized.  The process of science does contain a 
significant social element to it, but the propositions and beliefs themselves are not 
individually social, for it is conceivable for a non-social species (or other form of 
consciousness, such as some possible artificial intelligence) to derive individual scientific 
propositions without a social or moralizing aspect to them. 
Going back to the discussion of how using the Durkheimian definition of religion 
allows for the articulation of there being a process and unification for both Religion-B 
and Religion-M through totemic representation, this definition can be extended to cover 
scientism because it contains both the Religion-B aspect and Religion-M aspect in it.  
Scientism inherently contains both “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to 
sacred things”, which is its Religion-B element, and also the tendency to desire to “unite 
into one single moral community called a Church”, which is its Religion-M element.  
Scientism develops not just an epistemological stance and methodology towards reality, 
such that science itself does, but it also carries with it a normative worldview which has a 
moralized exclusivity built into in that has pretensions toward comprehensive, unified 
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knowledge of all aspects of reality.  As a comprehensive, metaphysical system, those who 
adhere to scientism, as being “Science” as a kind of sacralized practice that only those 
trained and specialized in specific forms of knowledge, this kind of worldview is 
strikingly similar to many forms of traditional religion in which there is a sacred realm of 
reality only accessible through the knowledge and action of specialized experts.  These 
specialized experts are then called upon to spread the word and enlarge a cadre of 
followers towards understanding this truth while also allowing for an exclusive caste of 
experts to really generate knowledge7.   
As a final note on Scientism, and my schema more broadly, I wish to point out 
that calling Scientism as being religious doesn’t mean that Scientism isn’t actually the 
correct way to view reality.  There seems to be an inherent tendency among more 
conventional and atheistic intellectuals and scientists to call those things judged as being 
religious as being somehow automatically engaging in superstitious thinking or as 
engaging in a kind of mythological mode of perception.  However, just as most 
traditional religions assume that their comprehensive belief systems are completely true, 
so too would scientism believe itself to be true and, since there is ultimately no way to 
arbitrate between comprehensive belief systems in such a way as to convince everyone of 
one system being true over another, then so too may scientism actually be true and should 
                                                 
7 As a caveat towards who believe that this analogy is stretched too far, I remind the 
reader again of the difference between Scientism and science, in that it is Scientism 
which has a religious character while science itself allows for a kind of non-verification 
of its own propositions, which is something that also generally makes it different from 
being religious. 
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be considered a correct way of understanding reality.  In other words, calling scientism as 
being religious isn’t to invalidate it; it may in fact be the one, true religion that all of us 
have been searching for all along! 
 
Why Does This Matter? 
 
 Going back to the original formulation of “Religion-B” and “Religion-M” after 
that diversion regarding scientism, the question arises as to why, even if this is a valid 
distinction between these two aspects of Religion-C, would this distinction be useful or 
important?  First of all, it allows for a certain division of labor, both in terms of 
scholarship and of conceptual analysis, for this approach provides a justification for 
looking at the cognitive aspects of religion in terms of how specific beliefs function in the 
actions of individuals in one way, with a justification for looking at the social and 
“moral” aspects of Religion-C in another way.  As mentioned earlier, this division may 
also provide a blueprint for how the study of Religion-C can be looked at in the academic 
fields of psychology (and its associated fields cognitive science, philosophy, and more) 
and sociology in semi-independent ways.   
 On a different level, in terms of the analysis of the role of Religion-C in the flux 
of real social life, I believe that this distinction may also be valuable in the analysis of the 
differences between more conventional religions and other worldviews such as 
nationalism (and other “political religions”) and potential secular religious “worldviews” 
such as the aforementioned “scientism,” as well as “humanism,” and certain forms of 
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atheism.  Through the division of Religion-C into these two aspects of Religion-B and 
Religion-M, I believe that there can be a certain amount of justification in calling these 
unconventional worldviews as being “religious” because they contain strong elements of 
Religion-M within them.  Assuming for the moment that the dominant scientific view is 
largely correct at the “objective” metaphysical level, meaning that there is no evidence 
for metaphysical entities such as gods, angels, spirits, etc. which are fairly ubiquitous in 
most religious traditions, there are still often strong Religion-M elements in the scientific 
(and humanistic and atheistic) “worldviews” which center around notions of social unity 
and of forming a kind of moral community.  There are even elements of totemism in that 
many scientists may circle around an abstract totem called “Science,” or humanists may 
circle around a totem called the “Human”, or atheists may circle around a totem called 
“Reason.”  The argument is not that there isn’t such a thing called the “Human” (in terms 
of “humanism”) or “Science” (in terms of “scientism.”) Rather, the argument is regarding 
the apotheotic impulse to make something that is human into something that is sacred or 
even “divine”.  
 These perspectives are not just neutral, value-free perspectives but they contain, 
in fact, implicit moral perspectives as well.  In my schema, the fact that there still exists 
this implicit sense of a “moral community” of “believers” is evidence that what I’ve been 
calling Religion-M still exists behind these systems of beliefs.  Therefore, when certain 
atheists or rationalists or scientists argue that “religion” can (and sometimes MUST!) be 
eradicated or minimized, they are still arguing from a competing “religious” perspective 
in the sense defined by me earlier whereby all of reality is contained within a particular 
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worldview.  What these atheists and rationalists are saying is, in effect, “our version of 
Religion-M should minimize or displace all those crazy versions of Religion-B that are 
all about these strange beliefs that the scientific worldview has displaced.”  In other 
words, many think that they are “anti-religious,” but they really are so only in the sense 
of how they view religion to have been constituted and expressed up until now.8  They 
are, in effect, partisans for a different kind of religion or “religious” worldview rather 
than being anti-religion.  The social aspects of Religion-M are as strong as ever in these 
kinds of “religious” worldviews and I believe that there is wisdom in recognizing this 
truth rather than in assuming that things like humanism and atheism are overthrowing 
Religion-C altogether. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This is obviously a very speculative thesis and may ultimately prove itself to be 
more a piece of philosophy than of social science.  Using the popular criterion of 
“falsifiability,” as derived from the work of the philosopher of science Karl Popper, it 
may likely be impossible to operationalize the claims made in this thesis.  I believe that 
some distinctions, such as the ones that I’ve laid out, are useful in the very least in 
applying the perspectives and intellectual resources coming out of the sociology of 
religion to more unconventional systems like those “worldviews” contained in political, 
                                                 
8 They also still have some kind of Religion-B in the sense that all worldviews do involve 
certain beliefs and propositions that are representational and symbolic.  It is impossible to 
completely eliminate those aspects.   
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civic, and social ideologies.  The upshot to this entire argument is that I believe that we 
should conceive of a lot more aspects of our social worlds as containing an implicitly 
religious element to them and to examine how certain totems become the symbolic center 
of moral communities.  In the current climate of political fractioning and the growth of 
“identity politics,” we need to better understand how all these identities that we’ve 
crafted can have that religious quality to them regarding the circling of a moral 
community around an abstract representation of a particular identity.  Notions of 
orthodoxy and apostasy are increasingly coming to the forefront in these identitarian 
phenomena and, instead of believing that we are on the path of eliminating all aspects of 
religion from humanity, we should apply the means and methods of a sociology of 
religion to these kinds of socio-political movements. 
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